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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNTIED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                            
No: 05-2192
                            
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAVIER HART,
                  Appellant
                                                  
Appeal from the Untied States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No: 03-cr-00827
District Judge: Mary A. McLaughlin
                           
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 14, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, McKEE and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
                           
OPINION
                            
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Javier Hart appeals from the judgment of conviction that was entered after a jury
2convicted him of several charges related to his distribution of “crack” cocaine. For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. .
Since we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this dispute,
we need only set forth the procedural or factual background of this appeal. We review the
district court’s findings of fact during the suppression hearing for clear error.  Our review
of the court’s application of legal principles is plenary. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d
318, 386 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Nolan- Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir.
1998).
Hart first claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from 7012 Emerson Avenue, in Upper Darby.  We reject that claim
substantially for the reasons set forth by the district court in its well reasoned and detailed
Memorandum and Order, dated October 18, 2004.  The district court agreed that there
was no probable cause to search that residence, but allowed the physical evidence that
was seized to be introduced at trial pursuant to the “good faith exception” first announced
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.897 (1884).   Accordingly, our inquiry is limited to
determining whether it was objectively reasonable for the police officers executing that
search to rely upon the authority of the search warrant. United States v. Ninety-two
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-two, Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137 (3d
Cir. 2002).  The district court explains why the conduct of those officers was objectively
3reasonable even though probable cause did not exist to search 7012 Emerson Avenue. 
Moreover, although the warrant was not supported by probable cause, it was not “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable.” Id., at 146. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that
the officers acted in good faith in searching that residence, and the evidence they seized
was properly admitted at trial. 
 II
 Hart also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the
amended information the government filed before trial charging several prior drug
offenses pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851.  That filing subjected him to a mandatory minimum
sentence of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A). Hart claims that the
government filed the amended information to punish him for asserting his constitutional
right to go to trial and refusing to plead guilty.  However, the government argues without
contradiction that it initially filed an information containing only one prior felony drug
offense because that was part of the plea agreement Hart initially agreed to accept. See
Appellee’s Br. at 35.  Pursuant to those plea negotiations, the government had agreed to
rely upon only one of Hart’s prior felony drug offenses thereby reducing his exposure to a
mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years imprisonment rather than the mandatory
minimum of life imprisonment that would otherwise have applied.  See 21 U.S.C. §§
841(b)(1)(A) and 924(c).  
4In an analogous context, the Supreme Court has explained: “[s]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charges to file or bring
before a jury, generally rests in his[/her] discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978).  Accordingly, we reject Hart’s attempt to argue that the timing of the
filing of the amended notice somehow suggests the prosecutor’s bad faith. It suggests
only that Hart lost one of the advantages a negotiated plea would have given him.  “While
confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a
discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights,  . . .  the imposition of
these difficult choices [is] an inevitable--and permissible--attribute of any legitimate
system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas.” United States v. Hodge,
412 F.3d 470 (3d. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted, brackets in original).
III.
Hart also claims 21 U.S.C. § 841 is facially unconstitutional.  However, as Hart
himself recognizes, that claim is foreclosed by our holding in United States v. Kelly, 272
F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 2001).  Similarly, Hart’s argument that the prior offenses used to
enhance his sentence must be established by a jury based upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt following the decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) is also foreclosed by our jurisprudence. See
  We recognize that Hart’s arguments are partly intended merely to preserve his*
Booker argument in the event that the Supreme Court overrules its decision in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
5
United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236 (3d. Cir. 2005).*
IV.
For all the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.
